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There exist in intellectual history periods where, following intense deliberation on a 
question, something like a consensus emerges. Typically the consensus amounts to a 
refinement of the competing views on the question rather than some final resolution. These 
refined views are then presented as the official ‘debate’ on the question, and faithfully 
reproduced in university courses world-wide. Something of this sort has happened with 
theories of nationalism, or to be more accurate, with theories of the modernity of the nation. 
Indeed, the issue of the modernity of the nation looms large in the Smith, Özkrimili and 
Guibernau & Hutchinson texts.  
The modernity of the nation is a question most famously articulated by Ernest 
Gellner when he asked: ‘Do nations have navels?’, that is, are they the progeny of pre-
modern ethnic parents, or are they new imaginings produced by modern conditions without 
parents at all? The ‘debate’ identifies three answers to this question: (i) the primordialist: 
the nation is an organic and enduring part of human society; (ii) the  modernist: 
nationalism, a product of modernity, constructs nation as if they were organic but they have 
no essence; they are like an onion which can be peeled away to nothing; and (iii) the ethno-
symbolist: the nation is a modern imagining of a pre-existing ethnic group and so, like an 
artichoke, has modern ‘leaves’ surrounding an ethnic ‘heart’1. 
Of these three views, the latter two are the ones which dominate ‘the debate’ with the 
Özkrimili text sympathetic to the modernist view, whilst the Smith and Guibernau & 
Hutchinson texts favour ethno-symbolism. However, while they may dominate ‘the debate’ 
at the expense of primordialist theory, they do so at a significant cost to their accounts of 
the subjectivity of ordinary people’s ethnic and national identities, a cost that, for all its 
faults, primordialism does not incur. Where modernism typically ignores the 300-pound 
atavistic gorilla in the corner, ethno-symbolism fails to ask the right questions about this 
atavism. Ten years of research and reflection have shed much light on the history and 
evolution of nations and nationalism, but added very little to the pressing question of why 
we ordinary folk ‘primordialise’ our ethnies1 and nations, and the political and social 
consequences of this. In this article I will hope to show how this is the case, using the 
example of Zulu nationalism in South Africa during recent times, and arguing that we need 
                                                 
1 A metaphor introduced by Özkrimili 2000. 
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The origins of the debate on the modernity of the nation dates back to the 1960s, and more 
specifically the arguments of Ernest Gellner. In his 1964 Thought and Change Gellner 
sketched the broad outlines of a theory of nationalism more fully developed in Nations and 
Nationalism (1983). Gellner’s argument was that nationalism, the belief that political and 
national units should be congruent, arose in response to the particular conditions of the 
modern age. More specifically, Gellner points to the changed role of culture in modernity. 
Whereas in traditional societies culture reinforced the role-bound structure of society and 
therefore could be specific to each social strata, modern industrial society requires the 
social mobility of all. Consequently, everyone must learn the high culture (language, 
literacy, numeracy, technical skills) functional to the operation of the economy, and the 
state facilitates this through mass education.  
To the theoretical account of the changing role of culture, Gellner adds a historical-
sociological dimension. The spread of modernity is uneven as it moves outward from 
Western Europe across the traditional world. As its spreads across the world, modernity 
destroys local villages and towns, drives people towards cities, and generates conflicts 
between newcomers and the more established. Over time this conflict becomes ethnicised, 
and before long the intelligentsia on both sides drive nationalist movements of secession. 
Nationalism then, is the political process by which high culture is imposed on society, and 
the nation is the ‘high cultural’ identity invoked by nationalism. These are phenomena 
peculiar to our modern times. 
 While Gellner’s arguments have come in for much criticism they mark the first real 
attempt to understand nationalism in terms other than those of nationalists themselves, 
lifting theories of nationalism to a higher level of sophistication. Up until World War Two 
the serious scholarly work on nationalism were either histories of particular nationalisms or 
typologies of nationalisms. Gellner’s intervention changed all that. The 1970s and 1980s 
witnessed a flood of modernist theories linking nationalism to different features of the 
modern world from international capitalism, to industrialisation, the state, urbanisation and 
cultural practices. For most modernists, nationalism produces the nation, that is, the nation 
is a new phenomenon ‘invented’, ‘imagined’ or ‘constructed’ to serve the particular ends of 
the social structure/class/élites. Not only is it not what it presents itself to be, but it has no 
essence. It is, in the words of Stanley Hoffman, an onion which can be peeled away to 
nothing.  
In the 1990s modernist theories came under attack from a new school of ethno-
symbolists led by Gellner’s student, Anthony Smith. Placed somewhere between 
primordialists and modernists, ethno-symbolists affirm the significance of pre-modern 
ethnies in the formation of modern nations, placing more emphasis than modernists do on 
popular forms of cultural engagement and the endurance of these forms over time. If 
modernists see the nation as an onion, a recent construction of many layers, then ethno-
symbolists see the nation as an artichoke, with modern leaves surrounding an ethnic heart. 
Today the debate on nationalism and modernity is one of the onion versus the artichoke. 
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But before we get there we should start with nationalist discourse itself and the much 
maligned ‘organic’ primordialist. 
 
 
The nation as organic 
 
Perhaps the classical western expression of the primordialist view of ethnies and nations 
comes from German romanticism. On this view ethnies and nations were basically the same 
thing: an ‘organic’ social entity or ‘organism’ given by nature and so both an essential and 
enduring feature of human society bearing a distinct cultural essence. Clearly for these 
classical primordialists the ‘modernity’ of the nation does not emerge as a key question -- 
the ethnie/nation has always existed and it will always do so. This noted, nationalist 
discourse does allow for some flexibility in the life-history of the nation, at least in so far as 
the nation, like Sleeping Beauty, may enter a period ‘slumber’ or ‘recess’ only to be 
‘awakened’ by the Handsome Prince, a nationalist hero. For nationalist smoochers think 
Garibaldi, Bismark, Buthelezi, Milosevic and company.  
As Orkirimli (2000:67) points out, these ‘fairytale’ beliefs are elements in the most 
nationalist histories. Typically these histories claim: (i) the antiquity of the nation, (ii) a 
golden age of some sort, (iii) the superiority of the national culture to others, (iv) a period 
of ‘slumber’ or ‘recess’ and (v) the national hero who comes and awakens the nation. 
Certainly this structure applies to the story of the Zulu as told by Zulu nationalists down the 
twentieth century but especially during the transition to democracy from 1990 to 1994 (see 
Buthelezi 2000). Notably the same structure applies to the current discourse on the African 
renaissance propagated by ANC leadership (see Makgoba 1999). The point is this: these 
nationalist narratives are usually more romantic myths aimed at contemporary audiences 
rather than actual histories of the past. Like fairytales, they engage and comfort with 
pleasant fantasy, offering little by way of real explanation. 
There are more sophisticated primordial accounts of ethnies and nations however. 
These are of two types: sociobiological or cultural. Sociobiological primordialism is 
associated with the writings of Pierre van den Berghe. Drawing on Darwinian views, van 
den Berghe argues that an individual will co-operate with her relations over outsiders so as 
to maximise the survival of her genetic material. This drive to secure genetic reproduction 
is just naturally given, and helping one’s family ensures the survival of one’s genes. For 
van den Berghe this bias towards kin becomes generalised down history to larger groups 
like tribes, ethnic groups and nations who we recognise as kin groups through shared 
physical appearance and cultural characteristics. On this view the ethnic group is actually 
an extended family. 
The obvious criticism levelled against van den Berghe is that common cultural 
characteristics do not always coincide with common genetic heritage. The evident changes 
in the number, composition and even existence of ethnic groups and nations are 
inconsistent with the idea of an enduring biological community. Indeed, the Zulu 
foundation myth is one of nation-building through including many different peoples (see 
Buthelezi 2000). Thus genetic homogeneity was not a requirement of being Zulu. One 
possible response that Smith (1998:150) notes might be to appeal to psychological 
mechanisms like ‘projection’ and ‘identification’ though which ordinary people imagine the 
ethnie to be a family of sorts. However, this shifts the basis of group identity away from 
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genetics and into the social realm. The nation now just seems like a family, whereas van 
den Berghe’s claim is that it is actually a family.  
Following from this, the most persuasive of the primordial arguments come from 
scholars who emphasise the cultural rather than natural basis of group identity. Edward 
Shils and Clifford Geertz are those thrust forward in the ‘debate’ as the representatives of 
cultural primordialism. For these scholars, the significance of the ‘primordial’ ties of 
kinship, religion, blood, race, language, locality and the like for ordinary people are central. 
These bonds form the deeply-rooted and emotionally-charged basis of ethnic and national 
identification. Thus being Zulu becomes about the ties of history, of culture, of language, 
food, place, landscape -- all the cultural goods we absorb as children and grow to love as 
adults. In sum we are all born into a people constituted by a distinct and deeply-rooted 
cultural essence.  
Ranged against the cultural primordialist view of ethnies are the instrumentalists. 
These scholars start from the notion that ethnic identities are socially constructed not 
essentially given, and may often be chosen as a strategic means to an end -- hence the 
designation ‘instrumentalism’. A good example is Eller and Coughlan’s (1993:187) critique 
of cultural primordialism. They hold that Shils & Geertz make the mistake of reading 
‘primordial attachments’ as (i) a priori or given prior to social experience of interaction, (ii) 
as more powerful than other ties, thus over-riding them and (iii) as affective or emotional. 
They go on to criticise this placing of primordial ties, and thereby ethnic identities, outside 
of the social realm, as the overwhelming evidence from empirical studies shows how, in 
response to changing conditions, ethnic and national identities are chosen and re-imagined 
by different generations, genders or various interest groups. 
Two examples from the Zulu case illustrate the instrumentalist case nicely. The first 
is the impact of the British in redefining Zuluness in the late nineteenth century by 
describing and treating all black people in Natal as ‘Zulu’. Despite the fact that these people 
were not part of the Zulu kingdom and did not see themselves as Zulu, ‘Zulu’ they became 
to officialdom, and with time, even to themselves (Wright and Hamilton 1996). The second 
is the significance of gender for ethnic identity construction amongst the Tsonga, an ethnic 
group adjacent to the Zulu in the north of KwaZulu-Natal. Webster (1991) found ethnic 
identities were profoundly gendered in the same community such that women defined 
themselves as Tsonga and the men as Zulu. Webster explains this through the greater power 
that each identity offered the respective gender, but whatever the reason, the point is that 
ethnicity is not necessarily more fundamental than other social identities and may even be 
embraced strategically. It is a cultural product not a cultural given. 
While Eller and Coughlan’s argument is persuasive when directed at crude cultural 
primordialism, it is not clear that it ought to be directed at Shils and Geertz specifically. 
Both Smith (1998:157-8) and Özkrimili (2000:72-3) argue that Shils and Geertz do not 
regard primordial ties as merely matters of emotion, nor do they a priori prioritise 
primordial ties above other concerns. Indeed Geertz gives prominent place to the role of the 
state in stimulating beliefs about primordialness. Smith and Ozkirimly agree that a more 
accurate reading of cultural primordialism is of a theory which focuses on the perceptions 
and beliefs of people. This more sophisticated cultural primordialism is an approach which 
identifies the webs of meaning that participants embrace, and the way certain ties are 
presented as foundational of social relations, that is, it draws attention to the way we 
‘primordialise’ aspects of the world.  
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If this reading is correct then much of the sting goes out of the 
primordialist/instrumentalist debate as both sides agree that the ethnic group is not simply 
culturally given. For Özkrimili (2000:73), this move so bankrupts the old debate that, on his 
view, any theorist who defines ethnicity or nationality solely in terms of how people feel 
could be called a cultural primordialist. However, this claim is overstated as 
instrumentalists and primordialist may well still differ in respect of  how these feelings 
come about. Do they emerge out of an interest-based choice, as some instrumentalists 
suggest, or are they an imposed social inheritance presented in essential terms? The latter 
seems closer to the work of Geertz and Shils. A further consequence of ‘sophisticated’ 
cultural primordialism is that it breaks the association between some essentialist account of 
ethnies/nations and the longevity of ethnies/nations. One does not have to embrace the story 
of a pre-social, essential, organic entity to argue that ethnies/nations are pre-modern.  
This is precisely Anthony Smith’s move when he introduces the idea of 
perennialism to describe those theorists who believe that nations have been around for a 
long time but who are not necessarily primordialists. This view is at the heart of Anthony 
Smith’s own ethno-symbolist position. In effect we can read Smith as re-orientating the 
terms of the primordialist/instrumentalists debate (what is the ethnie/nation?) to a new 
question (how old is the nation?). While successful, this move does have some theoretical 
costs, notably it sets to one side the central questions identified above: why do we ordinary 
people ‘primordialise’, and must we ‘primordialise’? Must we ‘primordialise’ only in 
respect of ethnic groups and nations -- as Smith suggests -- or does this apply to any 
identity?  
While Smith and other ethno-symbolists advance some argument about how we 
primordialise and thus how ethnies/nations endure over time, without answering the why 
question too many pressing issues are ignored. Are we to believe nationalists that 
ethnies/nations necessarily have a special status as political identities? If so, what does this 
mean for human rights, regional and international governance? If so, what does this mean 
for the design of political institutions, especially the state? What of minorities, immigrants 
and national groups within countries? What does it mean for tolerance, liberalism, 
socialism and indeed enlightenment beliefs more generally? Smith and the ethno-symbolist 
may have defined for themselves a debate they can win, but is it really the debate to win? In 
answering this we must first consider what arguably has been the most significant school in 
nationalist theory: modernism. 
 
 
The nation as onion 
  
As already noted, modernism emerged as a reaction to primordialism, especially the 
popular narratives of nationalist themselves. For the modernist of any shade, primordialism 
is suspect. This is because before the modern epoch nations were largely unknown, most 
people had a very local sense of things and to the extent that their sensibilities were 
attracted by larger collective actors they were things like cities, religious communities, 
empires and kingdoms. Further, it is far from easy to define and differentiate the special 
cultural content of various nations in the world today. Indeed, many nationalists bicker 
amongst themselves as to what the ‘true’ cultural content of the nation is2. Lastly, the 
enduring character of nations is not supported by the historical record. Nationalists struggle 
to explain the rise and fall of nations. Why is it that they ‘slumber’ for so long and ‘re-
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awaken’ later? For modernists, nationalists have put the cart before the horse. Nations have 
no existence apart from the beliefs and goals of nationalists who appeal to ‘the nation’ to 
legitimate political, cultural or economic projects. In short, nationalism invents nations, or 
more accurately, nationalists imagine them, and nationalism only emerges under modern 
sociological conditions. 
To the modernist suspicion that primordialism is bad science is added a normative 
view that nationalism is often conducted in bad faith. This has two moments to it. The first 
is that nationalists engage in some form of deception from, at the one extreme, the 
conscious manipulation of popular sentiments for élite ends to, at the other, a sentimental 
imagining of a collective fantasy blind to historical truth. The second moment of bad faith 
is political. As Fred Halliday (2000:158-9) observes, fixing one’s ethnic group/nation as 
given closes the door on others. This is why nationalism is often associated with wars, 
massacre, intolerance but also ‘the everyday nastiness of much nationalism, its petty-
mindedness, its mean-spiritedness, the endless self-serving arguments, the vast culture of 
moaning, whingeing , kvetching, self-pity, special pleading, that “Narcissism of small 
differences” that Freud so rightly denounced’.  
Modernist accounts of nations and nationalism can be divided into those which 
emphasise the link between nationalism and socio-cultural transformations like Gellner, 
Benedict Anderson and Miroslav Hroch; those which emphasise the link between 
nationalism and modern economic transformations like Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter; 
and those that emphasise the link between nationalism and modern political transformations 
like John Breuilly, Paul Brass and Eric Hobsbawm. Space forbids anything but a quick 
sketch of one protagonist from each. Given that I have already covered Gellner I will move 
straight to Hechter’s model of internal colonialism and then look at John Breuilly’s views 
on the state. 
 Michael Hechter’s arguments arose in response to ethnic conflict in the United 
States in the 1960s. The mainstream response to this crisis was ‘assimilationism’, the view 
that minority groups were poor as they were isolated from the national culture. The solution 
was to educate and socialise children of these groups in the cultural mainstream, and thus 
bring to an end to maladjustment. For Hechter the assimilationist view was too optimistic. 
It assumed that over time, capitalism would draw all underdeveloped regions and peoples 
under its purview, eventually bringing both a degree of cultural homogeneity and economic 
prosperity to all. Against this view Hechter proposed the ‘internal colonialism’ model 
drawn from Leninist theory, and also used in leftist analysis of apartheid South Africa (see 
Wolpe 1995). This model holds that the ‘core’ will dominate the ‘periphery’ politically and 
exploit it economically. The core are the ‘advanced groups’ of people created by the spread 
of modernisation across new territories, and the periphery are ‘less advantaged’ groups 
within the same space. Through what Hechter calls a ‘cultural division of labour’ the 
advanced group secures the prestigious social roles for its members, identified in (often 
‘metropolitan’) cultural terms, while excluding the other (‘indigenous’ cultural) group. On 
the Marxist view the ‘less advantaged’ are dependent on the advantaged for exploitative 
jobs, credit, commerce and trade. Group solidarity is further enhanced by the perception of 
economic oppression and good intra-group communication. Thus cultural differences are 
super-imposed on exploitative economic relationships, so creating fertile ground for 
nationalist movements. 
 Hechter’s thesis is a powerful one but is commonly criticised on two grounds. First, 
it does not fit the facts. Hechter develops his argument through a case-study of Celtic 
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nationalism in Britain yet Scotland does not fit the model as it is far from being under-
developed. Similar examples of minority cultural groups with little real political power and 
yet substantial economic status abound. Catalonia and Jewish Americans are two further 
cases. Moreover, internal colonialism cannot explain nationalist movements in places 
where there is no uneven development. Second, Hechter reduces cultural cleavages and 
ethnic sentiments to economic and spatial factors, yet it is far from clear why these cultural 
differences must take ethnic form as opposed to the cultural differences of English classes 
for example. Further, why must cultural and regional boundaries always coincide? The 
association might be a common one, but it is not the only one. This suggests that forces 
other than ‘spatialised economics’ influence the formation of ‘cultural groups’. To put it 
another way, ethnicity must be treated as an independent variable alongside economic 
processes, not subservient to them.  
 To this point, one commonly directed against modernists, someone like Gellner 
might reply by pointing to the intersection of interest and culture, and the links between 
culture and identity. There are at least two problems with this. First, the association 
between culture and identity should be recognised as an empirically contingent one (see 
Piper 2002a). This is because the ‘defining culture’ of an ethnie or nation often changes, or 
is contested, while membership of the ethnie or nation is typically socially-ascribed by 
one’s descent. Thus, at least for the individual, one may be able to contest the meaning 
‘being an X’ but it is very difficult to shed the X identity as it is ascribed by others and not 
simply chosen by oneself. For this reason I prefer to think of ethnic and national identities 
as (usually) made rather than chosen, and made across generations rather than in one 
lifetime. The point is that it may turn out that the cultural requirements of modernity have 
identity consequences or it may not.  
Second, the Gellnerian is still unable to explain why we ‘primordialise’ our ethnic 
or national identity. To put the problem another way, why do ordinary people often feel so 
strongly about their ethnicity/nationality but less so about other identities? Many 
modernists would argue that this is not always true, that often ethnicities/nationalities are 
embraced more lightly. However, even if this is true some of the time (for example with 
multi-cultural civic nationalisms), much of the time it is not. There are countless examples 
of the powerful sentiments evoked by ethnic nationalisms. Further, if it were true that 
‘primordialisation =  identity + disempowerment’, then why does this not apply to social 
identities like gender or class? Is it not because of the way ethnicity is constructed in 
cultural terms, and the particular affective character of many of our cultural attachments? 
Surely this must set ethnic identity apart from most others. 
If empirically the problem of primordial subjectivity is a real one, then it is a 
problem that haunts most modernists, including our final theorist John Breuilly. Like 
Hechter, John Breuilly’s theory of nationalism is firmly empirically rooted. In his 
Nationalism and the State, Breuilly considers thirty nationalist cases pointing out that 
nationalism is above all about politics and politics is about power. This stems from his 
definition of nationalism  as ‘political movements seeking or exercising state power and 
justifying such actions with nationalist arguments’. The theoretical problem then becomes 
trying to understand why nationalism has played such a significant role in pursuing power, 
more especially state power. Roughly following Durkheim, Breuilly identifies 
modernization as being about a change in the division of labour from ‘corporate’ 
(mechanical) to ‘functional’ (organic). The state itself is a product of this process with 
public powers being handed over to specialist state institutions understood as ‘public’ as 
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opposed to the ‘private’ realm of the market and the individual. The emergent problem of 
this design was how to relate public interests of citizens with the private interests of 
individuals. Nationalism offered this solution politically (the nation is a body of citizens 
who regulate themselves) and culturally (the nation is a collective community as indicated 
by a common culture). In this way nationalism could link the ideas of community as 
defined both the state and by society. Indeed, again in Durkheimian fashion, Breuilly 
observes that nationalism is distinguished by the unabashed celebration of ‘the community’ 
or as he puts it ‘nationalists celebrate themselves rather than some transcendent reality’.  
 The major critique of Breuilly centres on his limitation of the definition of 
nationalism to exclude nationalism as the language and ideology of cultural identity. This 
he does for methodological reasons yet his own analysis identifies a cultural identity as the 
basis for political mobilisation by nationalists. Further, while recognising that ‘people do 
yearn for cultural membership’ Breuilly resolves not to interrogate why this is, as it is too 
hard a problem! However, as Smith points out, investigating the process of nation-building 
is to come to terms with the self-understanding of nationalists. Much of the point of 
nationalism is to develop a people with a distinct sense of cultural identity, personality etc. 
As Smith argues (1998:95) nationalism is not just about élites but also about ordinary 
people and how ‘the latter can and do reshape the nationalist ideology in their own image’. 
It is this focus on ordinary people, their ‘primordialised subjectivity’ and how this links to 
national identity that Breuilly fails to address. 
 In short then, modernists may have the most convincing explanation of nationalism 
as an ideology and political movement of modernity, but they struggle to account for 
nationalism as a process of identity formation or ‘nation-building’, and why it is that 
ordinary people often, if not always, tend to ‘primordialise’ their ethnic and national 




The nation as artichoke 
  
Ethno-symbolism is the third and final school in ‘the debate’ on nationalism and modernity, 
positioning itself between primordialism on the one hand and modernism on the other. For 
ethno-symbolists, nations are not simply a product of modern processes but are often, if not 
always, heavily influenced by a pre-modern ethnic legacy. At the same time, this ethnic 
legacy is not naturally given, immutable, organic or the only significant social identity as 
crude primordialists believe. Rather, ethnic identities and the nations they inform are 
socially produced and reproduced through cultural processes which mark insiders from 
outsiders. Thus ethno-symbolists make a distinction between nationalism, which is 
acknowledged as a modern ideology or movement, and the nation, which is partly modern, 
but also typically founded on a ethnic base which stretches back into pre-modernity. Thus 
the nation can be compared to an artichoke in that, while it may have has modern ‘leaves’, 
they surround a pre-modern ‘heart’. 
John Armstrong is commonly identified as the founder of the ethno-symbolism. 
Heavily influenced by Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth, Armstrong adopts the 
social interaction model of identity formation. This view holds that groups tend to define 
themselves not so much by what they have in common but by how they differ from others. 
This means that group identity stems from processes of boundary construction and 
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maintenance. For Armstrong, ethnic boundaries are constructed and maintained through 
what he terms ‘myth-symbol complexes’. Here certain symbols are taken as ‘border guards’ 
distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’. They become integrated into myths which, over time, 
define an ethnic identity in relation to a common polity and help engender a sense of 
solidarity. Thus symbol, myth and communication are central to ethnic identity formation 
for Armstrong. 
It is another ethno-symbolist, John Hutchinson who fleshes out the kind of 
processes by which these cultural goods come to define group membership. Hutchinson 
advances a theory of cultural nationalism which, against Breuilly’s political definition, 
identifies ‘nation-building’ as a central nationalist phenomenon. Thus cultural nationalists, 
typically those who are cultural producers (poets, artists, performers, school teachers, 
religious leaders), look to create or reinforce a sense of national identity through a process 
of ‘moral regeneration’. This amounts to cultural work which affirms the common identity 
and gives it a particular meaning so as to build solidarity. Examples would include 
nationalist works of art and literature, language movements, introducing national holidays, 
rituals and festivals and so on. Hutchinson sees cultural nationalism as flourishing 
periodically in times of national crisis, and existing alongside political nationalism. The key 
point is that cultural nationalism acts as a constraint on political elites, both in 
circumscribing their world-view and in helping construct the popular view which political 
élites must appeal to under modern conditions. 
 Notably Hutchinson’s model applies almost perfectly to Afrikaner nationalism. 
Afrikaner identity was built in the first few decades of the twentieth century. Further, it was 
built by religious leaders, teachers and artists in explicitly linguistic and cultural 
movements during a time of ‘moral crisis and decay’ amongst descendants of Dutch 
settlers. It was only later in the 1930s and 1940s that this cultural nationalism was 
succeeded by the political nationalism associated with the National Party (Hofmeyer 1987, 
Grundlingh 1992, Giliomee 1995:191-7). This is not the case with the Zulu however, in the 
sense that the dominant forms of Zulu nationalism have been political rather than cultural, 
although Zulu cultural nationalists have made periodic, if somewhat desultory, attempts at 
moral regeneration (see Piper 2000: 200-1). Indeed Waetjen (2001) argues that one of the 
reasons Zulu nationalism ‘failed’ as a political project in recent times was because of a lack 
of a common content to Zuluness due to its gendered character. To my mind this speaks of 
a failure of cultural nationalism. 
In both Armstrong’s and Hutchinson’s accounts then, there is a profound sense of 
the importance of culture in constructing national identity and the ways this will impact on 
political nationalism. There is a key point of difference between these two views, and that 
concerns the endurance of ethnic groups down history. Where Hutchinson is cautious about 
projecting cultural nationalism back into history, Armstrong argues that the construction of 
nations can only be understood over the longue duree, that is several centuries, and that this 
perspective shows that nations were not invented in the modern era but were founded on 
existing, intense, long-standing and recurrent forms of ethnic identification. Armstrong 
arguments here are mainly historical, and he points to the slow evolution of national 
identities through the long-term survival of what he terms ‘myth-symbol complexes’. 
However, perhaps the most sophisticated version of the ethno-symbolist view 
belongs to Anthony Smith. Best articulated in The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Smith follows 
Armstrong in looking to the past for evidence of ethnic communities (or ethnies) which 
provide the foundation for modern nations. Like Hutchison and Armstrong, Smith (1998: 
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190) is looking for cultural evidence (national ‘structures, sentiments and symbolism’) and 
he finds much of it going far back. He uses this to develop a ‘historical sociology’ of 
ethnies. Like Armstrong and Hutchinson, Smith is not arguing that ethnic groups are 
natural, organic or primary but culturally constructed. However, like perennialists (and 
Armstrong) he suggests that they have been around for a long time and do, on the whole, 
provide material for modern nations.  
Moreover, and this is where Smith offers something distinctive, ethnies do this in 
two ways depending on whether they are ‘lateral’ ethnie, which are communities like 
aristocracies that do not deeply penetrate the social scale, or ‘demotic’ ethnie, which 
include a wider range of social strata and are more intensely bound to each other. Smith 
argues that ‘lateral’ ethnie tend to impose the national identity from the top-down the social 
scale by securing and then wielding state power, and this tended to yield ‘civic’ 
nationalism. Conversely ‘demotic’ ethnie tend to yield an ethnic nation through a process of 
cultural nationalism very similar to Hutchinson’s characterisation. Smith also notes that 
there is a third route where nations are formed through immigrant fragments to a country 
conjoining in a multicultural nationalism of some sort.  
Thus for Smith, while nationalism is modern, nations are only part-modern. 
Modernity does gives nations their unique characteristics: a definite territory, a public 
culture, economic unity and common rights and duties for citizens. However, nations are 
also the product of older, pre-modern ethnic ties and histories, and this lends them the 
mythical and symbolic dimensions which informs élite presumptions and popular 
consciousness. This means that the past places certain constraints on the present. This point 
is powerfully made by Caroline Hamilton (1998) in Terrific Majesty where she argues that 
the ‘inventions’ and ‘reinventions’ of Zulu history as centred on the figure of Shaka by 
white officials were significantly constrained and limited by indigenous accounts. In brief, 
the dominant narrative of Zulu history as centred around Shaka derives from an dialogue 
between of black and white. It was not simply invented nor imposed, nor was it ever 
uncontested or unauthorised. For Smith this helps explain why the most successful nations 
are those which are based on pre-existing ethnies, and why state-drive nationalisms as post-
colonial African and arguably the EU, struggle to transcend ethnic differences. 
While Smith’s basic thesis is persuasive there are three major problems that trouble 
me. The first is his definition of the nation drawing on various objective elements like a 
definite territory, economic unity etc. While it may be true that all nations are practically 
associated with these things, it is wrong to assume that this constitutes nationhood. If all 
there was to nationhood was the possession of certain objective characteristics then it 
would be possible to assign nationhood to a people who do not feel they are. The Zulu are a 
case in point. Despite possessing many of the objective criteria of nationhood most Zulu 
people do not believe that the Zulu have some special right to self-government or territory 
(Piper 2002b). Indeed, this wrong ascription is typical of much popular discourse on the 
Zulu, but intellectual work too. For example in Liberalism, Community and Culture Will 
Kymlicka writes ‘Why should the blacks be viewed as a single people when they are in fact 
members of different nations, each with its own language and political 
traditions’(1989:248). Of course, this is not what the vast majority of black people say 
when you ask them.  
The point, very simply, is that nationhood cannot be read off objective criteria 
linked to the state, or culture for that matter, but is better seen as a form of political 
identity, and thus involves the subjective self-understanding of ordinary people. This means 
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that national identity is always in a process of political construction – very much the 
assumption underlying what cultural nationalists do – but also Michael Billig’s (1995) 
account of banal nationalism. Of course the question of why national identity arises can be 
explained in respect of the objective features of modernity but they do not constitute the 
identity. For this we need to turn to the self-understanding of ordinary people, and in my 
view, when we do that we ought to confront the question of this particular social identity is 
often primordialised. 
Now ethno-symbolists do go someway down this road. They acknowledge the 
importance of popular subjectivities and point to the role in myth-symbol complexes in 
identity construction and transmission over generations. However, this response has its 
limits. First, as ethno-symbolists themselves acknowledge, the historical evidence of the 
subjectivities of ordinary people is patchy at best and often non-existent. This makes it 
difficult to interrogate the historical status of ethnic and national identities, like Zuluness 
for instance. A second and more substantial criticism comes from Breuilly and is targeted at 
the account of how these myth-symbol complexes are transmitted down time. Breuilly 
argues that institutions like the state play a central role in the transmission of myth-symbol 
complexes, but there is a marked institutional discontinuity with the advent of modernity, 
and thus ethno-symbolists must explain how this transmission nevertheless occurs. Smith’s 
response (1998:197) is to argue for the significance of institutions of everyday life as it 
were, as opposed to the narrow modernist list of state, economy and the like.  
Smith’s argument could be right but we do not yet know as it too underdeveloped. 
Indeed, and this bring me to my third claim, it is likely to remain under-developed until 
theorists of nationalism can offer some account of why ‘primordialisation’ occurs. Clearly 
answering a how question is not the same as answering a why question, but it does seem 
that some micro-sociological and/or social psychological account of how 
‘primordialisation’ is parasitic on some account of why it occurs. For example, for the 
crude primordialist this type of atavistic projection is ‘just what people do’ -- it is naturally 
the way they are. On this reading the need to explain how it happens disappears as it is 
naturally given. At the other extreme are those who doubt whether people actually 
‘primordialise’ at all, or if they do, it is because of some error caused by nationalist 
ideology or some similar story. On this view, the problem and thus its explanation, 
disappear. However, for the ethno-symbolist and I would suspect for most scholars of 
nationalism, it is clear that ordinary people often, if not always, do ‘primordialise’ ethnic 
and national ties. Why do we ‘primordialise’ at all? Smith does not say although he clearly 
believes we do. Why these ties and not others? Again, Smith does not say, although he 
assumes that this ‘primordialising’ picks out a difference between ethnic/national and other 
social identities. Answering these questions would enable us to account for subjectivity in 
the kind of robust way needed to do more than observe that ethnies and nations have been 





One of paradoxical outcomes of ‘the debate’ on theories of nationalism and modernity is a 
wide-spread scepticism about a general theory that can explain all the myriad forms of 
nationalism. Smith claims that he believes it still desirable to search for one although it may 
well turn out to be impossible. Özkrimili views such a desire as a misplaced modernist 
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desire for one objective truth, and we would do better to abandon such a quest and embrace 
various partial theories that account for the various forms of nationalism. In my view this 
scepticism is somewhat misplaced and quickly forgets much of the progress in 
understanding, for example, the modernity of nationalism and the significance of ethnic 
identities for nation-building. Moreover, I suspect much of this scepticism comes from a 
frustration born of not addressing a question central to ethnic identification and thus nation-
building: ‘what motivates primordialism?’ 
 In my view we have already made much progress down this road. Most would agree 
that ethnic identities are socially made rather than given by nature or God or anything else. 
Most would agree that ethnic identities are inherited rather than chosen by an individual. 
Yes, ethnic identities do rise and fall, but typically this is a complex and long process over 
generations. Most would agree that the meaning of ethnic identities is typically constructed 
in cultural terms. Most would agree that these terms are often primordially charged. Why? 
To me, the answer to this must come from some psychological account of human 
development that moves beyond a simple essentialist or interest account. Cultural 
primordialists were the first to gesture in this direction and their impulse seems a good one.  
 How are ethnic identities primordialised? We have some suggestions like Barthian 
boundary maintenance. In my view this explains how one knows who one is, but it does not 
explain why one feels strongly about it. Thus an answer to the ‘Why?’ question might help. 
Knowing the answer to these questions will help pick out what separates ethnic and 
national identities from other identities; it will help fill out our understanding of nation-
building; and it will help us better relate the political and cultural moments to nationalism, 
and thus its broader social and political significance. While answers to these questions are 
no guarantee of a general theory, they can only help for they address that aspect of 






1  Here I follow Anthony Smith in using the French term ‘ethnies’ for the more 
cumbersome ‘ethnic groups’. 
 







Billig, Mick. 1995 Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. 
 
Buthelezi, M. 2000. King Shaka Memorial Celebration Address, Mambuka Sportsground, 





Eller, J. & Coughlan, R. 1993. ‘The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of 
Ethnic Attachments’, Ethnic and Racial Studies. 16(2), pp.181-202. 
 
Giliomee, Herman. 1995. ‘The Growth of Afrikaner Identity’, in William Beinart & Saul 
Debow (Eds). Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa. London & 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. London: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Grundlingh, A. 1992. ‘Social History and Afrikaner Historiography in a Changing South 
Africa: Problems and Potentials’, Collected Seminar Papers in the Societies of Southern 
Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 19(45). London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
University of London. 
 
Halliday, Fred. 2000. ‘The perils of community: reason and unreason in nationalist 
ideology’, Nations and Nationalism. 6(2), pp. 153-171. 
 
Hamilton, Caroline. 1998. Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of 
Historical Invention. Cape Town & Johannesburg: David Philip. 
 
Hofmeyer, I. 1987. ‘Building a Nation from Words: Afrikaans Language, Literature and 
Ethnic Identity, 1902 – 1924’, Shula Marks & Stanley Trapido (eds). The Politics of Race, 
Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa. London & New York: Longman. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Makgoba, Malegapuru (ed). 1999. African Renaissance: The New Struggle. Cape Town: 
Mafube & Tafelberg. 
 
Maré, Gerhard. 1992. Brothers Born of Warrior Blood. Johannesburg: Ravan. 
 
Piper, Laurence. 2000. The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South 
Africa. PhD. Cambridge University, Great Britain. 
 
Piper, Laurence. 2002a. ‘Do I need Ethnic Culture to be Free? A Critique of Will 
Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism’, South African Journal of Philosophy. 21(3), pp.180-189. 
 
Piper, Laurence. 2002b. ‘Nationalism without the Nation: The rise and fall of Zulu 
nationalism in South Africa’s transition to democracy, 1975-1999’, Nations and 
Nationalism. 8(1), pp. 73-94. 
 
Waetjen, Thembisa. 2001. ‘The limits of gender rhetoric for nationalism: A case-study 





Webster, David. 1991. ‘Abafazi Bathonga Bafihlakala: Ethnicity and Gender in a KwaZulu 
Border Community’, African Studies. 50(1), pp. 243-271. 
 
Wright, J. & Hamilton, G. 1996. ‘Ethnicity and Political Change Before 1840' in Morrell, R. 
(ed) Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal. Durban: Indicator. 
 
Wolpe, H. 1995. ‘Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation 
to Apartheid’, William Beinart & Saul Dubow (eds). Segregation and Apartheid in 
Twentieth Century South Africa. London & New York: Routledge. 
 
